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Abstract
The paper presents a model of endogenous innovation and growth, in which technological
change is path dependent. The historical pattern of technological development plays a central
role in determining the pace of future technological change. Path dependence is explained using
a distinction between fundamental and secondary knowledge. The economy moves endogenously
between periods of drastic and non-drastic innovation. Technological lock-in is shown to be a
special case of path dependence. The model provides a rationale for cycles in technological
leadership. This rationale exists in equilibria with positive levels of fundamental research and
in a world with no imitation.
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11 Introduction
A variety of authors in the literatures on the history and microeconomics of technology have argued
that innovation is ‘path dependent.’ That is, the historical pattern of technological development is
thought to play a central role in determining the pace of future technological change.3 An extreme
example is ‘technological lock-in’, where agents continue to employ an existing technology even
though potentially more productive technologies could be found. Historical examples include the
replacement of ‘mule-spinning’ by ‘ring-spinning’ in the Eighteenth Century Cotton Industry, the
switch from the ‘Leblanc’ to the ‘Solvay’ Soda production process, and, more recently, the continued
use of the QWERTY keyboard.4 This paper presents a tractable model of endogenous innovation
and growth, in which technological change is path dependent and in which technological lock-in
may occur.
The analysis combines four features of technological change emphasized in empirical work and
discussed further below. First, innovation is shaped by the intentional choices of proﬁt-seeking
agents. Second, the discovery of new technologies is an intrinsically uncertain process. Third,
technological progress is the result of a combination of ‘fundamental innovations’, which open
up whole new areas for technological development, and ‘secondary innovations’, which are the
incremental improvements that realize the potential in each fundamental innovation. Fourth, the
secondary knowledge acquired for one fundamental technology (eg mule-spinning) is often of limited
relevance for the next (eg ring-spinning).
The main ﬁndings of the paper are as follows. First, these four features of technological change
provide a microeconomic rationale for path dependence. In particular, if spillovers of secondary
knowledge across fundamental technologies are incomplete, an increase in the stock of secondary
knowledge relating to one fundamental technology m reduces agents’ incentives to engage in research
directed at the discovery of fundamental technology m + 1. Second, depending on the (random)
3See, in particular, Arthur (1994), David (1975,1988), Dosi (1988), Mokyr (1990), and Rosenberg (1994).
4See, respectively, Broadberry (1998) and Sandberg (1969), Lindert and Trace (1971), and David (1985).
2interval of time between fundamental innovations, the economy moves endogenously through pe-
riods of ‘drastic’ and ‘non-drastic’ innovation. That is, depending on the (random) interval of
time between fundamental innovations, a new fundamental technology either may or may not face
competition from existing technologies at the proﬁt-maximizing monopoly price.
Third, in periods of non-drastic innovation, equilibrium employment in fundamental research is
monotonically decreasing in the stock of secondary knowledge accumulated for an existing funda-
mental technology. Fourth, technological lock-in is a special case, where the stock of accumulated
secondary knowledge becomes so large that equilibrium employment in fundamental research falls
to zero. Fifth, a model of endogenous technological change with path dependence provides a ra-
tionale for cycles in technological leadership, where an initially backward country catches-up with
and overtakes an initially more advanced country. This rationale applies in equilibria with positive
levels of fundamental research and is not limited to the special case of technological lock-in. Cycles
in technological leadership may occur even in a world with no international knowledge spillovers
and no imitation. Once international knowledge spillovers are allowed, the extent of technologi-
cal catch-up and leapfrogging depends on the relative magnitude of spillovers of fundamental and
secondary knowledge.
The model’s tractability enables us to consider a very general speciﬁcation of secondary knowl-
edge spillovers across fundamental technologies, which encompasses the special cases of no spillovers
and perfect spillovers. It also enables us to extend the analysis in a variety of directions. First, we
introduce uncertainty over the magnitude of secondary knowledge spillovers. This further general-
izes the dynamics of technological change in the model. A distinction emerges between temporary
technological lock-in (where it is not proﬁtable to employ a new fundamental technology, once
discovered, for small realizations of secondary knowledge spillovers) and permanent technological
lock-in (where it is no longer proﬁtable to search for new fundamental technologies given the ex-
pected magnitude of secondary knowledge spillovers). Second, we introduce multiple intermediate
goods sectors. Technological change remains path dependent, and individual sectors may experi-
3ence technological lock-in, while the economy as a whole exhibits endogenous growth as a result of
both fundamental research and secondary development. Third, we show that the paper’s results
are robust to the introduction of diminishing returns in the process of secondary development.
The paper is related to three main strands of existing work. First, there is a literature which
considers technological lock-in in models where the arrival of new technologies is exogenous and
agents decide whether or not to adopt these technologies (see, for example, Arthur 1989, Brezis et
al. 1993, Chari and Hopenhayn 1991, Parente 1994, Jovanovic and Nyarko 1996, and Solow 1997).
Following a wide range of empirical evidence, this paper models the arrival of new technologies as
an endogenous process. This is not only in accord with the empirical evidence, but also yields new
insights. For example, technological lock-in is a special case of a more general phenomenon (path
dependent technological change), path dependence can be explained using a distinction between
fundamental and secondary knowledge, and the economy moves endogenously through periods of
drastic and non-drastic innovation.
Second, the endogenous growth literature contains a number of models with one or more of the
four features of technological change listed above. Thus, Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman
and Helpman (1991) present models of endogenous quality-augmenting innovation, in which the
outcome of costly investments in R&D is uncertain, but in which there is no distinction between
fundamental and secondary innovation. Aghion and Howitt (1996, 1997), Helpman and Trajtenberg
(1998), Jovanovic and Rob (1990), and Young (1993) all present models in which a distinction
between diﬀerent types of technological change exists. However, there is no analysis of the idea
that technological change is path dependent or that technological lock-in may occur.
Third, there is a literature concerned with ‘cycles in technological leadership’, where an initially
backward country catches-up with and eventually leapfrogs an initially more advanced country.
This hypothesis has received considerable attention in the economic history literature, including,
for example, Broadberry (1994, 1998), Kindleberger (1995), and Nelson and Wright (1992). Thus,
Broadberry (1994, 1998) notes that Britain’s early industrial development was largely based upon
4low throughput, craft-based, skilled labour intensive methods of manufacture. These techniques
were progressively reﬁned and developed during the nineteenth century, and it is argued that this
provides part of the explanation for Britain’s slow adoption of more modern methods of manufac-
ture, ﬁrst introduced in the U.S. and involving high throughput, machine intensive, mass production
of standardized products. The choice and development of these two alternative methods of manu-
facture is seen a key determinant of the evolution of relative levels of productivity and income per
capita.
Cycles in technological leadership have been formalized in models of technology adoption with
exogenous arrival of new technologies (eg Brezis et al. 1993) and in models of Northern innovation
and Southern imitation (eg Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, 1997). In models of technology adop-
tion, cycles may occur if an initially advanced country becomes locked-into one technology, while
it remains proﬁtable for an initially backward country to adopt a more sophisticated technology.
This explanation continues to exist in the present paper. However, modelling the arrival of new
technologies as an endogenous process yields new insights. In particular, cycles in technological
leadership are a more general feature of path dependent technological change. They exist in equi-
libria with positive levels of fundamental research and are not restricted to the case of technological
lock-in. Cycles in technological leadership are explained by the distinction between fundamental
and secondary innovation, and occur even in a world with no international knowledge spillovers
and no imitation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the empirical motivation for the four
features of technological change listed above and for the ﬁndings of path dependence and techno-
logical lock-in. Section 3 introduces the basic model of economic growth with a single intermediate
goods sector. Section 4 solves for general equilibrium, establishes the path dependent nature of
technological change, and proves that technological lock-in may occur. Section 5 explores the impli-
cations for ﬁnal output growth. Section 6 introduces uncertainty over the magnitude of secondary
knowledge spillovers. Section 7 generalizes the analysis to allow for a large number of intermediate
5input sectors. Section 8 summarizes the paper’s conclusions. An Appendix shows that the paper’s
results are robust to introducing diminishing returns in the process of secondary development.
2 Technological Change
Of the four features of technological change listed above, the role of intentional choices in de-
termining the rate of innovation and the pervasive uncertainty of the innovative process are well
documented (see, for example, Schmookler 1996, Mansﬁeld et al. 1971, and the discussion in Aghion
and Howitt 1992 and Grossman and Helpman 1991). There is also substantial support for the idea
that technological progress is achieved through a combination of fundamental innovations and a
much larger number of secondary developments that realize the potential of each fundamental in-
novation (see, for example, Rosenberg 1982, Mokyr 1990, and the discussion in Aghion and Howitt
1996 and Young 1993).
The fourth feature of technological change is also supported by a substantial body of empirical
evidence. This is the idea that the secondary knowledge acquired for one fundamental technology
is often of limited relevance to the next. One example from economic history is the replacement
of the ‘mule’ (invented by Crompton in 1779) by ‘ring’-spinning (discovered by Thorp in 1828) in
the Cotton Industry during the early Nineteenth Century.5 Each of these technologies required a
distinct set of skills and physical machinery. Mule spinning in particular required specialized skills
and considerable strength (hence operatives were predominantly male), whereas these skills were
of little relevance in ring spinning, which could in fact be carried out by a largely unskilled female
labour force.
The U.K. cotton industry had grown to be the largest in the world through the use of the mule
and the earlier inventions of the spinning jenny and water frame. However, even once the technology
for ring-spinning was known, the U.K. industry was very slow to adopt the technology compared
to all other major cotton producers. One of the main reasons cited by economic historians is the
abundant supply of skilled mule spinners in the U.K., whose specialized skills would be rendered
5The discussion here draws on Broadberry (1998), Mokyr (1990), and Sandberg (1969).
6obsolete by the new technology.6 Other examples include the historical switch from the Leblanc to
the Solvay soda production process and the contemporary example of the acquisition of QWERTY
speciﬁc skills by touch typists.7
Together, these four features of technological change will provide a microeconomic explanation
for path dependence. A fundamental innovation is “both .... an artifact to be developed and
improved (such as a car, an integrated circuit, a lathe, each with its particular technoeconomic
characteristics) - and a set of heuristics (eg Where do we go from here? Where should we search?
What sort of knowledge should we draw on?)” (Dosi 1988, page 1127). Each fundamental technol-
ogy provides a particular set of opportunities for secondary development, and this historical path of
technological development will, in general, have implications for agents’ incentives to search for new
fundamental technologies. In this way, an economy’s or a sector’s particular history of incremental
development will inﬂuence endogenous rates of innovation and long-run growth.
An extreme example of path dependence is when the process of secondary development proceeds
so far, that there no incentive to invest in the discovery of a new fundamental technology, and the
economy becomes locked-into an existing fundamental technology. The most frequently quoted
e x a m p l ei st h eQ W E R T Yk e y b o a r dr e f e r r e dt oa b o v e( s e eD a v i d1 9 8 5 ) . H o w e v e r ,t h e r ea r ea
wide range of other examples, both from economic history (see the discussion above and Frankel
1955), and from contemporary experience (see Shapiro and Varian 1998, Chapter 5 for a number
of IT-related examples).
3T h e M o d e l
3.1 Introduction
We consider an economy populated by a sequence of overlapping generations indexed by t ∈ [1,∞).
Each generation consists of a large number of consumer-workers (H) who live for two periods. Each
worker is endowed with one unit of labour per period and an exogenous quantity of land (L/H).
6See, in particular, Broadberry (1998, Chapter 10) and Sandberg (1969).
7See, respectively, Lindert and Trace (1971)a n dD a v i d( 1985).
7Time is indexed by τ, and we choose units for time such that each period of a generation’s life lasts
for one unit of time.8
The economy consists of four sectors: fundamental research, secondary development, inter-
mediate input production, and ﬁnal goods production. Intermediate inputs are indexed by their
quality or productivity, and this depends upon a stock of fundamental knowledge and a stock of
secondary knowledge. Fundamental knowledge is modelled as a sequence of potentially more pro-
ductive blueprints for intermediate input production. The realization of the productive potential
of these blueprints depends on the accumulation of secondary knowledge. Secondary knowledge is
modelled as the acquisition of human capital that is speciﬁc to a particular fundamental technology,
in the sense that it is more productive when used with that technology than when used with any
other fundamental technology.
The timing of decisions is summarized in Figure 1, and is as follows. At the beginning of period 1,
workers inherit a stock of blueprints for fundamental technologies from the previous generation, and
decide whether to engage in fundamental research or secondary development. Secondary developers
spend period 1 assimilating and augmenting a body of existing secondary knowledge inherited from
the previous generation. Fundamental researchers spend period 1 engaged in (uncertain) research
directed at the discovery of a new, potentially more productive, fundamental technology. All
research uncertainty is realized at the end of period 1.
<Figure 1 about here>
Production and consumption take place in period 2 of workers’ lives. Some secondary knowl-
edge (fundamental technology-speciﬁc human capital) is required in order to produce intermediate
inputs, and these are therefore produced by secondary developers in period 2. Final goods are
produced with intermediate inputs and land.9 If a worker is successful in fundamental research
in period 1, she receives a one-period patent for the new fundamental technology. Bargaining
8Thus, generation t is born at some time τ and dies at time τ + 2. In order to simplify notation, we suppress the
implicit dependence on time, except where important.
9Land is a speciﬁc factor, used only in ﬁnal goods production, and could also be interpreted as physical capital.
8with secondary developers takes at the beginning of period 2 about how to divide the surplus
from intermediate input production. If research is unsuccessful in period 1, intermediate inputs
a r ep r o d u c e dw i t ha ne x i s t i n gf u n d a m e n t a lt e c h n o l o g yi np e r i o d2 .S i n c ef u n d a m e n t a lk n o w l e d g e
spills over across generations, all individuals have access to existing fundamental technologies, and
production of intermediate inputs occurs under conditions of perfect competition.10
3.2 Consumer Preferences
Workers are endowed with one unit of labour per period. At the beginning of period 1, they
decide whether to engage in fundamental research or secondary development. Since some secondary
knowledge is required in order to produce intermediate inputs in period 2, this corresponds to a
decision about their lifetime labour supply. We denote the number of workers entering fundamental
research by HF
t and the corresponding number entering secondary development by HS
t .T h e r ei s
no disutility from supplying labour, and preferences are deﬁned over consumption of the ﬁnal good.
Workers are assumed to be risk neutral, and the lifetime utility of a representative consumer-worker
in generation t i st h u sal i n e a rf u n c t i o no fs e c o n d - p e r i o dc o n s u m p t i o no ft h eﬁnal good,
Ut = c2t (1)
3.3 Production and Technology
Following Aghion and Howitt (1992), ﬁnal goods output (y) is produced from intermediate inputs
(x)a n das e c t o r - s p e c i ﬁc factor of production which is interpreted as land (l). For simplicity, we
begin by considering a single intermediate goods sector. Section 7 extends the analysis to allow for
multiple intermediate goods sectors. Production of ﬁnal goods occurs under conditions of perfect
competition and with a Cobb-Douglas technology,
10It is also possible to consider patents of more than one period in length (which requires patent rights to be
enforced across generations). In this case, bargaining with secondary developers takes place both when fundamental




2t , 0 < α < 1 (2)
where A2t denotes the productivity or quality of intermediate inputs, and we choose ﬁnal goods
output for the numeraire so that p2t =1f o ra l lt.
The key departure from the standard quality ladder model is the assumption that techno-
logical progress takes the form a sequence of fundamental technologies, each of which may be
improved through a process of secondary development. Fundamental technologies are indexed by
k ∈ {0,1,...,m}; k denotes the interval starting with the kth innovation and ending with the k+1st,
while m is the most advanced fundamental technology currently available. Each fundamental tech-
nology is potentially more productive than the previous one, but the realization of this production
potential is dependent on a process of secondary development. Conditional on the same level of
secondary development, each successive fundamental technology has a quality or productivity of
γ > 1 times the last. The stock of fundamental knowledge available to generation t is determined by
the most advanced fundamental technology currently available, and is thus Fm = γm.F(0), where
we normalize F(0) to 1.
The productivity of each fundamental technology may be increased through a process of sec-
ondary development. If we denote the stock of secondary knowledge that can be employed with a
fundamental technology k by ˜ Sk (we refer to this as the ‘eﬀective stock of secondary knowledge’),
then the quality or productivity of intermediate inputs produced with fundamental technology k is
as follows,
A2t = A2tk =( F2tk)
ν .˜ S2tk, ν > 0 (3)
That is, the quality or productivity of intermediate inputs is assumed to be a constant elasticity
function of the stock of fundamental knowledge and the eﬀective stock of secondary knowledge. The
structure of knowledge is as illustrated in Figure 2.
<Figure 2 about here>
10The eﬀective stock of secondary knowledge captures the idea that secondary skills are funda-
mental technology-speciﬁc and spill over imperfectly across fundamental technologies. If a worker
has accumulated a quantity Sj of secondary skills speciﬁc to a particular fundamental technology
j, we assume that the eﬀective stock of secondary knowledge for all fundamental technologies k
(˜ Sk)i sa sf o l l o w s ,
˜ Sk =
φz(Sj)i f k = j − z
. . .
φ(Sj)i f k = j − 1
Sj if k = j
φ(Sj)i f k = j +1
. . .
φz(Sj)i f k = j + z
,
z ≥ 0,j + z ≤ m
φ : <+ → <+ (4)
The stock of secondary knowledge is assumed to be bounded below by 1 (Sj ≥ 1a n dφ(1) = 1),
and this may be interpreted as a minimum level of secondary knowledge available to all fundamental
technologies.
The speciﬁcation in equation (4) is very general and encompasses a whole range of diﬀerent
assumptions concerning the nature of secondary knowledge spillovers. Each of these assumptions
corresponds to a diﬀerent set of restrictions placed upon the function φ(·). For example, we may
consider the two special cases of no spillovers of secondary knowledge (˜ Sj+1 = φ(Sj) = 1 for all
Sj ≥ 1) and perfect (or complete) spillovers (˜ Sj+1 = φ(Sj)=Sj for all Sj ≥ 1). The empirical
discussion above suggests that secondary knowledge spillovers are in fact imperfect, and we therefore













That is, the accumulation of secondary knowledge for one fundamental technology j has a pos-
itive eﬀect on the productivity of other fundamental technologies k 6= j (φ0(Sj) > 0). However, the
accumulation of secondary knowledge speciﬁc to fundamental technology j raises the productivity
11of j by a greater proportion than it raises the productivity of all other fundamental technologies
k 6= j.11
The assumption of imperfect knowledge spillovers is plausible, and is supported by the empirical
discussion above. We begin by considering the properties of the model when the assumption in (5)
is made; it is straightforward to consider how the results of the analysis change if the assumption
is relaxed. Since φ(1) = 1, equation (5) implies that φ(Sj) <S j for all Sj > 1. That is, only some
of the secondary knowledge acquired for fundamental technology j c a nb et r a n s f e r r e dt oo t h e r
technologies k 6= j. The arrival of each fundamental innovation results in secondary knowledge
obsolescence, and this is one respect in which growth is a process of creative destruction.
In the speciﬁcation in equation (4), the size of secondary knowledge spillovers depends on the
distance in technology space between fundamental technologies k and j. This is consistent with the
empirical modelling of knowledge spillovers in, for example, Jaﬀe et al. (1993). However, it does
treat less sophisticated (k<j ) and more sophisticated (k>j ) fundamental technologies symmet-
rically. One might want to allow secondary knowledge spillovers to be larger for less sophisticated
technologies. To capture this, we also consider the special case where secondary knowledge spills
over perfectly to all fundamental technologies k<j(˜ Sk = Sj for all k ≤ j), but imperfectly to all
fundamental technologies k>j(˜ Sk = φk−j(Sj) for all k>j ).
All that remains to complete the speciﬁcation of production is to consider the technology for
intermediate inputs. We assume that these are produced by secondary developers according to a
constant returns to scale technology,
x2t = h2t, (6)
where h2t denotes the number of secondary developers employed in intermediate input produc-
tion in period 2.
11Where, from (3) and (4), the proportion by which an increase in Sj raises the productivity parameter A for
fundamental technology j is simply 1.
123.4 Fundamental Research and Secondary Development
F u n d a m e n t a lr e s e a r c h e r ss p e n dp e r i o d1e n g a g e di nr e s e a r c hd i r e c t e da tt h ed i s c o v e r yo ff u n d a m e n -
tal technology m+1. Following Aghion and Howitt (1992), and in line with the second characteristic
of technology emphasized in the introduction, we assume that fundamental research is uncertain.
Each of the HF
t individuals entering fundamental research innovates with probability λ,w h e r e
0 < λ < 1. If more than one individual innovates, a one-period patent to the new fundamental
technology (m+1) is allocated randomly among the HF
t researchers. The probability that any one











Taking logarithms in (7) and diﬀerentiating with respect to HF
t , it is clear that the probabil-
ity of an individual receiving the patent (Λ(HF
t )) is monotonically decreasing in the number of
researchers HF




If workers enter secondary development, they spend period 1 assimilating and augmenting the
body of secondary knowledge inherited from the previous generation. This takes the form of a
distribution of eﬀective secondary knowledge, ˜ S2(t−1)k, across all known fundamental technologies
k ≤ m. Secondary developers choose endogenously for which fundamental technology k ≤ m
to acquire secondary knowledge. If they choose to acquire secondary knowledge for a particular
fundamental technology j, they augment the stock of secondary knowledge for this technology, Sj,
by a constant proportion µ>1. The impact on the eﬀective stock of secondary knowledge for all
other fundamental technologies k 6= j is determined using equation (4),13
12An alternative would be to assume that the probability an individual researcher receives the patent is independent
of H
F
t . For example, suppose that, if H
F
t workers enter fundamental research, there is a probability λ (where
0 < λ < 1) that one researcher obtains the patent to fundamental technology m + 1. All of the paper’s results are
robust to this alternative speciﬁcation. In particular, direct analogues of Propositions 1 and 2 exist.
13In the speciﬁcation in (8), secondary development is technologically unbounded (though, in an equilibrium with
13˜ S2tk =

            
            
φz(µ.S2(t−1)j)f o r k = j − z
. . .
φ(µ.S2(t−1)j)f o r k = j − 1
µ.S2(t−1)j for k = j
φ(µ.S2(t−1)j)f o r k = j +1
. . .
φz(µ.S2(t−1)j)f o r k = j + z
,
µ>1,z ≥ 0,j + z ≤ m
φ : <+ → <+ (8)
4 General Equilibrium
4.1 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
General equilibrium is a set of prices for ﬁnal goods output, intermediate inputs of quality k ≤ m,
secondary developers working with intermediate inputs of quality k ≤ m, and land {ˆ p2t, ˆ q2tk, ˆ w2tk, ˆ r2t};
a set of expected lifetime returns to fundamental research and secondary development {ˆ V F
t , ˆ V S
t };a n
allocation of consumption, ﬁnal goods production, intermediate production, employment in funda-
mental research, employment in secondary development, and usage of land {ˆ c2t, ˆ y2t, ˆ x2tk, ˆ HF
t , ˆ HS
t ,ˆ l2t};
together with a choice of fundamental technology for secondary development (j,w h e r ej ≤ m).
Given the structure of decision-making in Figure 1, general equilibrium can be solved for in
two stages. First, we solve for equilibrium in the ﬁnal goods, intermediate inputs, secondary
developers, and land markets in period 2, for a given number of individuals entering fundamental
r e s e a r c ha n ds e c o n d a r yd e v e l o p m e n ti np e r i o d1( HF
t and HS
t respectively), a choice of technology
for secondary development (j), and for each of the two possible states of the world (successful and
unsuccessful research). Second, having determined the equilibrium period 2 payoﬀsi ne a c hs t a t e
of the world as a function of HF
t , HS
t ,a n dj, we solve for the equilibrium number of individuals
entering fundamental research and secondary development in period 1 and the equilibrium choice
of technology for secondary development in period 1.
positive fundamental research, it is economically bounded by the secondary knowledge obsolescence induced by the
arrival of each fundamental technology). The Appendix extends the analysis to introduce diminishing returns to
secondary development and an upper bound to the stock of secondary knowledge that may be accumulated. All of
the paper’s results are robust to this extension.
14Equilibrium in the ﬁnal goods, intermediate inputs, secondary developers, and land markets in
period 2 requires that the following set of conditions are satisﬁed. First, consumers choose second
period consumption to maximize utility taking prices {ˆ p2t, ˆ q2tk, ˆ w2tk, ˆ r2t} as given and subject to
their budget constraints. Second, ﬁnal goods producers choose output, usage of intermediate inputs,
and usage of land to maximize proﬁts taking prices {ˆ p2t, ˆ q2tk, ˆ w2tk, ˆ r2t} as given and subject to
the production technology. Perfect competition and constant returns to scale imply that, in an
equilibrium with positive ﬁnal goods output, there are zero equilibrium proﬁts in the ﬁnal goods
sector.
Third, equilibrium in the intermediate input and secondary developer markets depends upon
whether or not a fundamental innovation occurs. If research is unsuccessful, intermediate inputs are
produced with an existing fundamental technology k ≤ m under conditions of perfect competition.
If research is successful, the owner of the patent to the new fundamental technology m+1 bargains
with secondary developers at the beginning of period 2 about how to divide the surplus from
intermediate input production.
The objective of the fundamental researcher with technology m + 1 is to maximize the proﬁt
from intermediate input production
³
π2t(m+1) = q2t(m+1).x2t(m+1) − w2t(m+1)h2t(m+1)
´
,w h i l et h e
objective of secondary developers is to maximize the surplus from working with technology m +1





over employment and wages, the fundamental researcher and secondary developers take as given




2t ), the price of intermediate inputs produced with other technologies
(q2tk for all k ≤ m), the wages oﬀered by other technologies (w2tk for all k ≤ m), and the rental
rate for land (r2t). All bargaining power is assumed to reside with the fundamental researcher, who
therefore makes a take-it-or-leave it oﬀer to secondary developers.
The fourth condition for equilibrium in period 2 is that demand equals supply for secondary
developers, intermediate inputs, land, and ﬁnal goods. Having determined period 2 equilibrium as
15af u n c t i o no ft h es t a t eo ft h ew o r l d ,HF
t , HS
t ,a n dj,t h eﬁnal conditions for general equilibrium are
that (a) the expected lifetime return to fundamental research equals the expected lifetime return to
secondary development for positive levels of fundamental research (ˆ V F
t = ˆ V S
t for ˆ HF
t > 0), (b) the
fundamental technology chosen for secondary development j oﬀers the highest period 2 equilibrium
wage (w2tj ≥ w2tk for all k ≤ m), and (c) ˆ HS
t = H − ˆ HF
t .
4.2 Period 2 Equilibrium
4.2.1 Unsuccessful Fundamental Research
If research is unsuccessful, intermediate inputs are produced with an existing fundamental tech-
nology k ≤ m under conditions of perfect competition. The fundamental technology used in
equilibrium to produce intermediate inputs will be the one with the highest period 2 productivity
or quality (technology n),







Secondary developers receive a wage equal to their value marginal product (VMP) using tech-
nology n,













where a bar underneath a variable indicates the state of the world where fundamental research
is unsuccessful. There are zero equilibrium proﬁts from intermediate input production. Period 2
demand for secondary developers must, in equilibrium, equal their supply, as endogenously deter-
m i n e db yp e r i o d1c h o i c e s ,
ˆ h2tn = HS
t (11)
Equation (11) and the requirement that the land market clear (ˆ l2t = L) imply that period 2
ﬁnal goods output is,






In equilibrium, the rental rate on land equals its VMP using fundamental technology n. Impos-
ing the requirement that the ﬁnal goods market clears, we obtain equilibrium period 2 consumption
of the ﬁnal good,
ˆ c2t =ˆ y2t (13)
4.2.2 Successful Fundamental Research
A successful researcher receives a patent for the new fundamental technology m +1 ,a n di st h e
monopoly supplier of intermediate inputs produced using that technology. All bargaining power
is assumed to reside with the fundamental researcher. She therefore chooses output and wages
to maximize proﬁts, subject to the derived demand curve for intermediate inputs, the production
technology, the constraint that the wage oﬀered to secondary developers is greater than or equal to
the wage received with technologies k ≤ m,a n dt h ec o n s t r a i n tt h a tﬁnal goods production using
intermediate inputs produced with fundamental technology m+1 is no more expensive than using




















where b2tk(·) is the unit cost of producing ﬁnal goods output using intermediate inputs of
fundamental technology k, as a function of the price of intermediate inputs (q2tk) and the rental
rate for land (r2t). This constrained optimization problem may be written as,

















− ζ3[0 − h2t(m+1)]
(15)










+ ζ3 =0 (16)



















ζ3[0 − h2t(m+1)]=0 (20)
The successful researcher faces potential competition from all existing fundamental technologies
k ≤ m. Each individual in generation t has access to the blueprints for these technologies, and
the wage received from producing intermediate inputs using fundamental technology k ≤ m is
secondary developers’ VMP. Thus, the outside option of secondary developers in bargaining with the
successful fundamental researcher is their VMP with the most productive of all existing fundamental
technologies k ≤ m (technology n). From equation (14), proﬁts from intermediate input production
with fundamental technology m + 1 are monotonically decreasing in the wage paid to secondary
developers. Hence, in equilibrium, the holder of the patent to fundamental technology m +1w i l l
pay secondary developers a wage no higher than their outside option,







where a bar above a variable indicates the state of the world where fundamental research is
successful.
If equilibrium output of intermediate inputs is positive (ζ3 = 0 in equation (16)), there are
two possible equilibrium values for the price of intermediate inputs produced with fundamental
technology m+1. First, if it is cheaper for ﬁnal goods producers to employ fundamental technology
m+1attheproﬁt-maximizing monopoly price rather than the most productive existing technology
n, fundamental technology m+1 constitutes a ‘drastic’ innovation. In this case, the fourth constraint
in equation (14) fails to bind, and ζ2 = 0 in equation (16). Equilibrium output of intermediate
inputs produced with technology m + 1 and equilibrium employment of secondary developers are,













Using equation (22) in the derived demand curve for intermediate inputs, the proﬁt-maximizing




. ˆ w2t(m+1) =
1
α
. ˆ w2tn (23)







. ˆ w2tn.ˆ h2t(m+1) (24)









ˆ w2tn, ˆ r2t
´
where we use equations (23) and (21) to substitute for the equilibrium price of intermediate
inputs of quality m +1( q2t(m+1)), the equilibrium wage (w2t(m+1)), and the equilibrium price of
19intermediate inputs of quality n (q2tn). Since the unit cost function for ﬁnal goods production is










Second, if it is not cheaper for ﬁnal goods producers to employ fundamental technology m +1
at the proﬁt-maximizing monopoly price rather than the most productive existing technology n,
fundamental technology m + 1 constitutes a ‘non-drastic’ innovation. In this case, the fourth
constraint in equation (14) binds, and ζ2 > 0 in equation (16). The equilibrium price of intermediate
inputs produced with technology m +1( q2t(m+1)) is determined by the requirement that,
b2t(m+1)
³
ˆ q2t(m+1), ˆ r2t
´
= b2tn(ˆ w2tn, ˆ r2t)
where we use equation (21) to substitute for the equilibrium price of intermediate inputs of
quality n (q2tn). The successful researcher charges a ‘limit price’ that leaves ﬁnal goods producers
indiﬀerent between employing the new fundamental technology m + 1 and the most productive
existing technology n. Using the fact that the unit cost function is Cobb-Douglas, the equilibrium
price for a non-drastic fundamental innovation is thus,













. ˆ w2tn.ˆ h2t(m+1) (27)
Thus, equilibrium proﬁts from intermediate input production are given by equation (24) if a
fundamental innovation is drastic and equation (27) if a fundamental innovation is non-drastic.
Since 0 < α < 1, equilibrium proﬁts are necessarily positive for a drastic fundamental innovation,
20and hence equilibrium output of intermediate inputs produced with fundamental technology m+1
will be strictly positive (ζ3 = 0 in equation (16)). For a non-drastic fundamental innovation,
equilibrium proﬁts will only be positive if Γ2t(m+1) > 1o r( γν)
m+1−n .φm+1−n(S2tn) >S 2tn.T h i s
corresponds to a requirement that the new fundamental technology m +1 ,w h e nd i s c o v e r e d ,i s
more productive than the currently most productive technology n. If this condition is satisﬁed, the
limit price charged by a successful researcher yields positive equilibrium proﬁts from intermediate
input production. Thus, equilibrium output of intermediate inputs produced with fundamental
technology m + 1 will be strictly positive (ζ3 = 0 in equation (16)).
Both (a) the condition for a fundamental innovation to be drastic and (b) the condition
for positive equilibrium proﬁts with a non-drastic fundamental innovation are functions of the
secondary knowledge obsolescence induced by the discovery of the new fundamental technology
(φm+1−n(S2tn) <S 2tn). Since secondary knowledge spillovers are imperfect (equation (5)), the
accumulation of secondary knowledge speciﬁc to an existing fundamental technology n raises the
productivity of that technology by more than it raises the productivity of fundamental technology
m+ 1. An increase in the stock of accumulated secondary knowledge reduces the left-hand side of
the inequality in (25) and the value of the limit price in (26). In economic terms, an increase in the
stock of accumulated secondary knowledge makes it less likely that a new fundamental technology,
when discovered, will constitute a drastic innovation, and reduces the value of the equilibrium limit
price charged in the case of non-drastic innovation. Each of these implications receives further
consideration below.
For both drastic and non-drastic fundamental innovations, we require equilibrium period 2
demand for secondary developers to equal their supply,
ˆ h2t(m+1) = HS
t (28)
Equation (28) and the requirement that the land market clear (ˆ l2t = L) imply that period 2
ﬁnal goods output is,






In equilibrium, the rental rate on land equals its VMP using fundamental technology m +
1. Imposing the requirement that the ﬁnal goods market clears, we obtain equilibrium period 2
consumption of the ﬁnal good,
ˆ c2t = ˆ y2t (30)
4.3 Period 1 Choice of Technology for Secondary Development
Equations (10), (11), (21), and (28) imply that the equilibrium wage of secondary developers is
the same in the case of successful and unsuccessful research, and equals their VMP with the most
productive of the existing fundamental technologies k ≤ m in period 2 (technology n). Accumu-
lating secondary knowledge raises the productivity of the fundamental technology for which it is
acquired by a constant proportion µ>1 and the productivity of all other fundamental technologies
by a smaller proportion (equation (8)). In period 1, secondary developers will therefore choose to
acquire skills for the technology j which was the most productive of all existing technologies k ≤ m
in period 2 of the previous generation t − 1. After further secondary development, this technology
will remain the most productive in period 2 of generation t, and will yield the highest period 2
wage for secondary developers. In terms of the notation above, we have j = n,







In principle, any of the existing fundamental technologies k ≤ m may be the most productive.
However, if we begin with an initial distribution of eﬀective secondary knowledge such that all
fundamental technologies have the same stock of eﬀective secondary knowledge (˜ S20k = ˜ S20 for all
k), the most advanced fundamental technology m will always be chosen for secondary development
in each subsequent generation. This can be seen clearly for generation t = 1. The most advanced
fundamental technology m(1) has a higher stock of fundamental knowledge and the same stock of
22secondary knowledge as all other technologies, and will therefore be chosen for secondary devel-
opment. Secondary development will lead to an increases in the productivity of this technology
relative to all existing technologies k ≤ m(1). If no fundamental innovation occurs during genera-
tion 1’s lifetime, it will therefore remain optimal for generation 2 to choose for the most advanced
fundamental technology m(2) = m(1) for secondary development. If a fundamental innovation
occurs during generation 1’s lifetime, it will again remain optimal for generation 2 to choose the
most advanced fundamental technology m(2) >m (1) for secondary development. This follows from
the fact that, in order for equilibrium fundamental research to be positive, we require proﬁts from
intermediate input production with a new fundamental technology to be strictly positive. However,
we saw above that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for proﬁts to be strictly positive is that the
new fundamental technology, when discovered, has a higher level of productivity than the most
productive of all existing technologies.
Except for Section 6, the remainder of the paper will be concerned with equilibria where the
currently most productive fundamental technology m is chosen for secondary development. Hence,
except where otherwise indicated, we substitute m for n in the analysis that follows. It is straightfor-
ward to consider other equilibria. Section 6 introduces uncertainty over the magnitude of secondary
knowledge spillovers. In this case, a restriction on initial conditions no longer ensures that the most
advanced fundamental technology m(t) is the most productive in all subsequent generations t.A
newly discovered fundamental technology may have a lower realized level of productivity than the
currently most productive fundamental technology, and will not be used for intermediate input
production or chosen for secondary development by subsequent generations.
4.4 Equilibrium Levels of Fundamental Research and Secondary Development
Having determined the period 1 choice of fundamental technology for secondary development, this
subsection endogenizes the number of individuals entering fundamental research and secondary
development, and solves for general equilibrium. In an equilibrium with positive levels of funda-
mental research, we require the expected lifetime return from fundamental research (ˆ V F
t )t oe q u a l
23the expected lifetime return from secondary development (ˆ V S
t ),
ˆ V F
t = ˆ V S
t (31)
With probability Λ(HF
t ) an individual researcher obtains the patent to the next fundamental
technology m + 1 and enjoys an equilibrium ﬂow of proﬁts equal to (24) in the case of drastic
innovation and (27) in the case of non-drastic innovation. With probability (1 − Λ(HF
t )), she fails
to obtain the patent to fundamental technology m + 1 and receives zero period 2 returns from
fundamental research.14 The expected lifetime return from fundamental research is thus,
ˆ V F
t(m+1) = Λ( ˆ HF


















From the analysis above, the period 2 equilibrium wage of a secondary developer equals her
VMP with the currently most productive fundamental technology (j = n = m). This is true
irrespective of whether fundamental research is successful in period 1. The expected lifetime return
from secondary development is thus,
ˆ V S
tm =ˆ w2tm (34)
In equilibrium, we require that the number of secondary developers equals the supply of workers
minus the number of fundamental researchers,
ˆ HS
t = H − ˆ HF
t (35)
Using equations (32), (34), and (35) in the requirement that the expected lifetime return to
fundamental research equals the expected lifetime return to secondary development (31), we obtain,






.(H − ˆ HF
t ) (36)
Equation (36) determines the equilibrium allocation of workers to fundamental research and
secondary development. The left and right-hand sides of the equation may be interpreted as the
private marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt of fundamental research respectively. Since the terms
Λ(HF
t )a n d( H − HF
t ) are both monotonically decreasing in HF
t , we immediately obtain,




.(H − 1) > 1, a unique positive
equilibrium level of employment in fundamental research, ˆ HF
t , exists
Proof: Proposition 1 follows immediately from equation (36)
Proposition 1 makes clear that, in order for positive equilibrium levels of fundamental research
to occur, two conditions must be satisﬁed. First, we require Ω2t(m+1) > 1. This is a requirement
that equilibrium proﬁts from intermediate input production with the new fundamental technology,
if discovered, are strictly positive. As already discussed, this condition is necessarily satisﬁed for
drastic innovations. For non-drastic innovations, we saw that equilibrium proﬁts from intermediate
input production will only be positive if the new fundamental technology m+1ismoreproductive
than the currently most productive technology m. The most interesting set of parameter values
are those where, in the absence of secondary development (S2(t−1)m =1a n dS2tm = µ.1), a
new fundamental technology would constitute a drastic innovation (γν.φ(µ)/µ > α−α,w h i c hm u s t
hold for suﬃciently large γ). In this case, the economy moves endogenously between periods of
drastic and non-drastic fundamental innovation, depending on the (random) interval between the
discovery of fundamental technologies. The longer the interval of time since the discovery of the
last fundamental technology, the greater the accumulated stock of secondary knowledge (S2(t−1)m)
and the more likely a fundamental innovation will be non-drastic.





1) > 1. That is, we require the expected lifetime return to fundamental research to exceed the ex-
pected lifetime return to secondary development for the ﬁrst worker entering fundamental research.
25Whether this condition is satisﬁed depends on the accumulated stock of secondary knowledge re-
lating to fundamental technology m. The most interesting set of parameter values are again those
where, in the absence of secondary development (S2(t−1)m = 1 and S2tm = µ.1), the condition is
satisﬁed. That is, in the absence of secondary development, the expected lifetime return to funda-
mental research exceeds the expected lifetime return to secondary development for the ﬁrst worker
entering fundamental research, and equilibrium employment in fundamental research is strictly
positive. This must be the case for suﬃciently large values of λ and γ,s u ﬃciently small values of
α,a n ds u ﬃciently large values of H. The interior equilibrium is the interesting case, and therefore
the remainder of the paper concentrates upon it. However, it is also possible to analyze the cor-
ner equilibrium, where, even in the absence of secondary development, equilibrium employment in
fundamental research is zero.
The determination of equilibrium research employment is shown diagrammatically in Figure
3. Many of the comparative statics of the model are as expected from the quality ladder model
without a distinction between fundamental research and secondary development. For example,
equilibrium fundamental research is monotonically increasing in the probability of fundamental
innovation, λ, and the supply of labour, H. However, unlike the conventional quality ladder model,
the stock of secondary knowledge accumulated for fundamental technology m (S2(t−1)m) plays a
central role in determining the equilibrium amount of fundamental research directed at the discovery
of fundamental technology m +1 .
<Figure 3 about here>
Proposition 2: Under the assumption of imperfect secondary knowledge spillovers (0 <
φ0(Sm).Sm/φ(Sm) < 1),
(a) There is a critical value for the accumulated stock of secondary knowledge, S0
2(t−1)m ≥
1, such that, when S0
2(t−1)m is attained, fundamental technology m +1b e c o m e sanon-drastic
innovation.
(b) There is a second critical value for the accumulated stock of secondary knowledge, S1
2(t−1)m >
261, such that, when S1
2(t−1)m is attained, equilibrium employment in fundamental research is zero
and technological lock-in occurs.
(c) For the range of values for the stock of accumulated secondary knowledge, S2(t−1)m,i nw h i c h
fundamental innovation is non-drastic (S0
2(t−1)m ≤ S2(t−1)m ≤ S1
2(t−1)m), equilibrium employment in
fundamental research is monotonically decreasing in the stock of accumulated secondary knowledge.
Proof: See Appendix.
The eﬀect of the accumulated stock of secondary knowledge (S2(t−1)m) on equilibrium incentives
to engage in fundamental research provides the sense in which technological change is path depen-
dent. As the (random) interval of time since the discovery of fundamental technology m increases,
the accumulation of secondary knowledge relating to fundamental technology m aﬀects workers’
incentives to engage in research directed at the discovery of fundamental technology m +1 . I n
this way, the historical path of secondary development inﬂuences current incentives to engage in
fundamental research.
There are three implications of path dependence for endogenous rates of innovation. First, as
the stock of accumulated secondary knowledge increases, the secondary knowledge obsolescence
that would be induced by the discovery of fundamental technology m + 1 means this technology
(when discovered at a future point in time) is less likely to be a drastic innovation (Proposition
2(a)). Second, once the stock of accumulated secondary knowledge (S2(t−1)m) becomes suﬃciently
large that fundamental innovation m+1 is non-drastic, further secondary knowledge accumulation
reduces the equilibrium value of the limit price that can be charged by the researcher who discov-
ers fundamental technology m + 1. In this way, secondary knowledge accumulation reduces the
equilibrium proﬁts to be made from intermediate input production using fundamental technology
m + 1 and reduces current incentives to engage in fundamental research. Thus, for the range of
values for the stock of accumulated secondary knowledge (S2(t−1)m) in which fundamental innova-
tion is non-drastic, equilibrium employment in fundamental research is monotonically decreasing
in S2(t−1)m (Proposition 2(c)).
27Third, if suﬃcient further secondary knowledge accumulation occurs, the equilibrium limit price
that can be charged by a successful researcher and the corresponding proﬁts from intermediate in-
put production may fall to such an extent that the expected lifetime return for the ﬁrst worker
entering fundamental research no longer exceeds the expected lifetime return from secondary devel-
opment (Proposition 2(b)). In this case, the economy becomes locked-into the existing fundamental
technology, even though fundamental research would be proﬁtable in the absence of secondary de-
velopment. Despite the fact that potentially more productive fundamental technologies could be
discovered (more productive after the same level of secondary development), the secondary devel-
opment of the existing fundamental technology has proceeded to such an extent that it is no longer
proﬁtable to search for these alternative fundamental technologies.
In a model with endogenous fundamental innovation, technological lock-in is a special case of a
more general phenomenon: path dependent technological change. How far secondary development
must proceed before technological lock-in will occur is endogenously determined by the values of
the parameters λ,γ,ν,µ,H and the form of the function φ(·). Since the interval between two
fundamental innovations is a random variable, it follows that, for any fundamental technology m,
there is a ﬁnite probability that technological lock-in will occur. The time path of equilibrium
research employment as a function of the stock of accumulated secondary knowledge is plotted in
Figure 4.
<Figure 4 about here>
In Section 7, we extend the analysis to allow for many intermediate goods sectors. Techno-
logical lock-in may occur in individual sectors of the economy, while others continue to exhibit
positive levels of both fundamental research and secondary development. First, Section 5 considers
the implications of path dependent technological change for output growth with a single interme-
diate goods sector. Section 6 introduces uncertainty over the magnitude of secondary knowledge
spillovers.
285 Final Output Growth
From equation (2), the rate of growth of ﬁnal goods output between any two generations t−1a n dt
will be a function of three sets of inﬂuences: (a) fundamental knowledge accumulation, (b) secondary
knowledge accumulation, and (b) changes in employment in the intermediate goods sector. In
particular, the rate of output growth will depend upon whether or not a fundamental innovation
occurs in generation t. The discovery of a new fundamental technology m +1i ng e n e r a t i o nt has
two oﬀsetting eﬀects on ﬁnal goods output. On the one hand, it increases the stock of fundamental
knowledge, which raises ﬁnal goods output (F2t(m+1) = γ.F2(t−1)m) . On the other hand, it induces
secondary knowledge obsolescence, which reduces ﬁnal goods output (˜ S2t(m+1) = φ(S2(t−1)m) <
S2(t−1)m) . If a fundamental innovation occurs in generation t, the rate of growth of ﬁnal goods
output is, from equation (2),
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In an equilibrium with positive fundamental research, we saw that the new fundamental tech-
nology m+1 must have a higher level of productivity than the currently most productive technology
m: Γ2t(m+1) > 1o rγνφ(S2tm) >S 2tm. Therefore, the sum of the ﬁrst two terms in equation (37)
must be strictly positive. In economic terms, the positive direct eﬀect from increased fundamental
knowledge exceeds the negative indirect eﬀect from secondary knowledge obsolescence.
T h ep r e s e n c eo ft h et h i r dt e r mi ne q u a t i o n( 3 7 )i st h er e s u l to ft h ep a t hd e p e n d e n tn a t u r eo f
technological change. Proposition 2 established that, if a fundamental innovation is non-drastic,
equilibrium employment in fundamental research is monotonically decreasing in the stock of ac-
cumulated secondary knowledge, S2(t−1)m (as illustrated in Figure 4). Therefore, for non-drastic
fundamental innovations, equilibrium employment in fundamental research in generation t ( ˆ HF
t )
will diﬀer from that in generation t−1(ˆ HF
t−1), depending upon the stock of accumulated secondary
knowledge inherited by each generation. If generation t inherits a larger stock of accumulated
secondary knowledge than generation t − 1 (which depends upon whether a fundamental innova-
29t i o no c c u r r e di ng e n e r a t i o nt − 1), equilibrium employment in fundamental research will be lower
( ˆ HF
t < ˆ HF
t−1). Generation t allocates more labour to secondary development and intermediate
input production. This constitutes an additional source of growth in ﬁnal goods output, and is
reﬂected in the third term in equation (37).
If a fundamental innovation does not occur in generation t, the rate of growth of ﬁnal goods
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The accumulation of further secondary knowledge relating to fundamental technology m raises
ﬁnal goods output by the proportion µ>1. The presence of the second term in equation (38)
reﬂects the path dependent nature of technological change in exactly the same way as above.
The expected rate of growth of ﬁnal goods output between generations t and t−1 at the beginning
of generation t (E[ln(yt/yt−1)]) is a weighted average of ¯ ζt and ζt,w i t hw e i g h t sΛ( ˆ HF
t ). ˆ HF
t and
(1 − Λ( ˆ HF
t ). ˆ HF
t ) respectively. In principle, ¯ ζt m a yb ee i t h e rh i g h e ro rl o w e rt h a nζt, depending
upon the size of fundamental innovations and the extent to which secondary knowledge spills over
across fundamental technologies (depending upon the relative size of the ﬁrst two terms in equation
(37) and the ﬁrst term in equation (38)). However, if fundamental innovations are suﬃciently large
(large γ), ¯ ζt must necessarily exceed ζt. I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ee x p e c t e dr a t eo fg r o w t ho fﬁnal goods
output is monotonically increasing in the probability of fundamental innovation Λ( ˆ HF
t ). ˆ HF
t =
h





The probability of fundamental innovation Λ( ˆ Ht). ˆ Ht is monotonically increasing in equilibrium
employment in fundamental research. The eﬀect of the probability of fundamental innovation
on the economy’s expected growth rate provides one way in which path dependent technological
change inﬂuences economic growth. Proposition 2(c) established that, for non-drastic fundamental
innovations, equilibrium employment in fundamental research is monotonically decreasing in the
accumulated stock of secondary knowledge (S2(t−1)m). Thus, as the secondary development of an
30existing fundamental technology m proceeds, equilibrium research employment and hence the prob-
ability of fundamental innovation fall over time. The secondary development of one fundamental
technology reduces employment in fundamental research and decreases the economy’s expected rate
growth.
For both drastic and non-drastic fundamental innovations, the accumulation of secondary knowl-
edge relating to an existing fundamental technology m has a negative direct eﬀect upon the econ-
omy’s expected rate of growth. With imperfect knowledge spillovers (φ0(Sm).Sm/φ(Sm) < 1), the
accumulation of secondary knowledge relating to fundamental technology m raises the productivity
of fundamental technology m by a greater proportion than technology m+1. Hence, the larger an
economy’s accumulated stock of secondary knowledge (S2(t−1)m), the greater the fall in the quality
or productivity of intermediate inputs as a result of secondary knowledge obsolescence when fun-
damental technology m+1 is discovered. A larger stock of accumulated secondary knowledge thus
reduces the rate of growth of ﬁnal goods output when a fundamental innovation occurs (¯ ζt)a n d
hence the economy’s expected rate of growth (more formally, the second term in equation (37) is
monotonically decreasing in S2(t−1)m).
In Proposition 2(b), we established that, if secondary development proceeds far enough (S2(t−1)m ≥
S1
2(t−1)m), the economy will become locked into an existing fundamental technology. In this case,
the actual and expected rate of growth of ﬁnal goods output will equal ζt with ˆ HF
t =0 .W eh a v e
already seen that, for suﬃciently large fundamental innovations (large γ)a n das u ﬃciently small
rate of secondary development (as µ → 1), ζt < ¯ ζt.T h ee c o n o m y ’ se x p e c t e dr a t eo fg r o w t hw h e n
technological lock-in occurs is thus lower than in an equilibrium characterized by positive amounts
of fundamental research; the economy becomes locked-into a low growth equilibrium.
Path dependence in a model of endogenous innovation provides a rationale for ‘cycles in tech-
nological leadership’, where an initially backward country catches-up with and eventually leapfrogs
an initially more advanced country. This rationale exists in equilibria characterized by positive
levels of fundamental research; the point is made most clearly with an example. Consider two
31countries (A and B) in generation t. The two countries may trade the homogenous ﬁnal good,
but we begin by assuming no international knowledge spillovers. The two countries have identical
stocks of accumulated secondary knowledge for the current state of the art fundamental technology
(m). However, country A has a more sophisticated fundamental technology (mA >m B), and this
is reﬂected in a higher level of productivity and income per capita in country A. Consider the
evolution of technology from generation t onwards. Suppose that country A experiences a series of
failures in fundamental research. Secondary knowledge speciﬁc to fundamental technology mA ac-
cumulates over time. If this continues for a suﬃciently long length of time, the existing fundamental
technology will become so productive that fundamental technology mA + 1, if discovered, would
constitute a non-drastic innovation. Further secondary knowledge accumulation will reduce equi-
librium employment in fundamental research and hence reduce the probability that fundamental
technology mA + 1 is actually discovered.
In contrast, suppose that country B experiences a series of research successes. Productivity
and income per capita will rise as a result of a higher stock of fundamental knowledge. Secondary
knowledge obsolescence induced by the discovery of new fundamental technologies means that the
successors to technology mB are either more likely to be drastic innovations or, if they remain non-
drastic, will exhibit higher levels of equilibrium fundamental research employment. This increases
the probability of further fundamental innovation, with consequent increases in productivity and
income per capita. Thus, by generation t0 >t ,c o u n t r yB may have overtaken or leapfrogged country
A, both in the sense of acquiring a more sophisticated fundamental technology (mB >m A)a n d
having a higher level of income per capita.
Once international knowledge spillovers are introduced into this framework, the potential for
catch-up and leapfrogging depends upon the magnitude of international spillovers of fundamental
and secondary knowledge. For example, if there are fundamental knowledge spillovers but no sec-
ondary knowledge spillovers, this increases the ability of an initially backward country to overtake
or leapfrog its initially more advanced counterpart. Productivity in the backward country rises be-
32cause of a higher stock of fundamental knowledge. Moreover, the obsolescence of secondary knowl-
edge implied by the switch to a more advanced fundamental technology means that fundamental
innovations are more likely to be drastic or, if they are non-drastic, will be characterized by higher
equilibrium levels of fundamental research employment. Secondary knowledge spillovers with no
fundamental knowledge spillovers have exactly the opposite eﬀect. Since fundamental knowledge is
modelled as a sequence of potentially more productive blueprints, while secondary knowledge takes
the form of human capital, it seems plausible that spillovers of fundamental knowledge are larger
than those of secondary knowledge.
6 Uncertain Secondary Knowledge Spillovers
The analysis so far has presented a model of fundamental research and secondary development,
where technological change is path dependent and technological lock-in may occur. The extent of
secondary development of one fundamental technology aﬀects agents’ incentives to search for more
advanced fundamental technologies. The analysis is consistent with the large empirical literature
emphasizing the endogeneity of technological change and the wide range of empirical studies ar-
guing that technological change is path dependent. This Section extends the analysis to allow for
uncertainty in the extent of secondary knowledge spillovers. This results in more general dynamics,
whereby, even if fundamental research is proﬁtable, a newly discovered fundamental technology
may not be selected for intermediate input production or chosen for secondary development by
subsequent generations.
The speciﬁcation of secondary development is exactly as in Subsections 3.3 and 3.4 above, ex-
cept that we allow for uncertainty over the function φ(·) which determines the extent of secondary
knowledge obsolescence. Secondary knowledge spillovers are always imperfect in the sense of sat-
isfying the inequality in (5), but they are ‘large’ with probability χ and ‘small’ with probability
(1 − χ). More formally,





both ¯ φ(Sm)a n dφ(Sm) satisfy the restriction in (5)
¯ φ(Sm) > φ(Sm) for all Sm > 1
Equilibrium employment in fundamental research is determined in exactly the same way as
above, except that equations (36) and (33) must be modiﬁed to take into account the fact that
t h e r ea r et w op o s s i b l ev a l u e sf o rt h ef u n c t i o nφ(·). That is, equilibrium employment in fundamental
research depends upon expected secondary knowledge spillovers, while the decision whether to
actually produce intermediate inputs with a new fundamental technology m + 1 depends upon
the realized value of secondary knowledge spillovers.
There will be a critical value for the accumulated stock of secondary knowledge, such that
(a) fundamental research is proﬁtable based on expected secondary knowledge spillovers, but (b)
a newly discovered fundamental technology m + 1 has a lower level of productivity than the
currently most productive technology n for small realizations of secondary knowledge spillovers:
(γν)m+1−n.φm+1−n(Sn) <S n. In this case, equilibrium proﬁts from intermediate input production
with fundamental technology m+1 will be strictly negative. The new technology will not be used
in intermediate input production or selected for secondary development by subsequent generations.
This further generalizes the dynamics of technological change in the model. A restriction on
initial conditions will no longer ensure that it is always the most advanced fundamental technology
that is selected for secondary development. There are now two senses in which an economy may
become locked-into an existing technology. First, as before, the accumulated stock of secondary
knowledge may become so large that it is no longer proﬁtable to engage in research directed at the
discovery of a new fundamental technology (permanent lock-in). Second, the accumulated stock
of secondary knowledge may be consistent with positive equilibrium employment in fundamental
research, but a new fundamental technology will not be used in intermediate input production for
small realizations of secondary knowledge spillovers (temporary lock-in).
347 Many Intermediate Goods Sectors
This Section returns to deterministic secondary knowledge spillovers in order to extend the analy-
sis in two other directions. First, we introduce many intermediate goods sectors. In each of these
sectors, technological change may take the form of fundamental innovation and secondary devel-
opment. Second, we allow for the possibility that the secondary development of one fundamental
technology m may itself play a role in the discovery of technology m + 1; the very process of
secondary development may yield insights into the shape of future fundamental technologies.
The introduction of many intermediate goods sectors follows the approach taken for the stan-
dard quality ladder model (without a distinction between fundamental research and secondary
development) in Aghion and Howitt (1997). We assume that ﬁnal goods output is produced from






2ti , 0 < α < 1 (40)
In each sector i, the quality or productivity of intermediate inputs depends upon stocks of
(sector-speciﬁc) fundamental knowledge and eﬀective secondary knowledge,
A2tm(i) = Fν
2tm(i).˜ S2tm(i) (41)
where k(i) ∈ {0,1,...,m(i)} denotes the interval starting with the kth fundamental innovation
in sector i a n de n d i n gw i t ht h ek +1 st,a n dm(i) is the most advanced fundamental technology
currently available in sector i.
At the beginning of period 1, workers decide whether to engage in fundamental research or sec-
ondary development in a sector i. We denote the number of individuals entering either fundamental
research or secondary development in sector i by Hti = HF
ti + HS
ti. The process of fundamental
research is modelled in exactly the same way as in the basic model with only one intermediate
goods sector, and we assume that the probability of fundamental innovation in sector i is indepen-
35dent of that in all other sectors. Secondary development is also as before, except in the following
respect. As secondary knowledge is accumulated in sector i, we assume there is a probability δ > 0
(however small) that this secondary knowledge accumulation will itself result in the discovery of
fundamental technology m(i) + 1. In this case, the new fundamental technology will be employed
under conditions of perfect competition in sector i. The probability that any one fundamental











General equilibrium requires that the following conditions are satisﬁed. First, workers are
indiﬀerent between entering secondary development in sector i and all other sectors j 6= i,















Second, the return to secondary development in all sectors i i sg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt ot h e
return to fundamental research (when greater than the return to fundamental research, this will be
a case of technological lock-in in sector i),





.( ˆ Hti − ˆ HF
ti), ˆ HF
ti ≥ 0, (44)
where one of the above inequalities must hold with equality. Third, we require that the rental
rate for land is the same in sector i and all other sectors j 6= i,
















Fourth, we require that the markets for labour and land clear,
36I X
i=1
ˆ Hti = H (46)
I X
i=1
ˆ l2ti = L (47)
Taking equations (44), (43), and (45) for each sector i, and combining them with the market
clearing conditions (46) and (47), we obtain a system of 3I independent equations in 3I unknowns
{ ˆ Hti, ˆ HF
ti,ˆ l2ti}. Given the inherited stocks of fundamental and secondary knowledge for generation t
(F2(t−1)m(i) and S2(t−1)m(i) respectively), we may solve for each sector i for equilibrium employment
in fundamental research ( ˆ HF
it), the equilibrium number of workers entering either fundamental
research or secondary development ( ˆ Hit), and the equilibrium allocation of land (ˆ l2ti). It would be
straightforward to simulate the model for speciﬁc parameter values. Individual intermediate goods
sectors will become locked-into an existing fundamental technology m(i) whenever the accumulated
stock of secondary knowledge exceeds the critical value S1
2(t−1)m derived in Section 4. Whether this
critical value is attained depends upon the (random) interval between fundamental innovations in
sector i. Thus, in any generation t,t h e r ew i l lb ea ni n ﬂow of sectors into the state of technological
lock-in, and this inﬂow will depend on the distribution of the accumulated stock of secondary
knowledge (S2(t−1)m(i))a c r o s ss e c t o r si.
In the remaining intermediate goods sectors, fundamental research will continue to occur,





.( ˆ Hit −
ˆ HF
it). In these sectors, the aggregate probability that a new fundamental technology is discovered
(Λ( ˆ HF
it). ˆ HF
it + δ) depends upon both fundamental research and the extent to which secondary de-
velopment may itself result in fundamental innovation. In sectors locked-into existing fundamental
technologies, there is of course no research. However, as secondary development proceeds, there
will remain a constant probability δ that a new fundamental technology is discovered. Thus in any
generation t, there will also be a random outﬂow of sectors from the state of technological lock-
in. The evolution of aggregate ﬁnal goods output (40) over time depends upon both the number
37of sectors subject to technological lock-in (S2(t−1)m(i) ≥ S1
2(t−1)m) and equilibrium investments in
fundamental research ( ˆ HF
it) in all other sectors.
8 Conclusion
This paper has presented a model of endogenous innovation and growth, in which technological
progress is path dependent and technological lock-in may occur. The analysis is motivated by
the literatures concerned with the history and microeconomics of technology, in which these are
central themes. The paper provides a microeconomic rationale for path dependence using four
features of technological change emphasized in empirical work: endogenous innovation, uncertainty,
a distinction between fundamental innovation and secondary development, and imperfect spillovers
of secondary knowledge across fundamental technologies.
With imperfect secondary knowledge spillovers, an increase in the stock of secondary knowledge
relating to one fundamental technology m reduces agents’ incentives to engage in research directed
at the discovery of technology m+1. Technological change is path dependent, in the sense that the
historical path of secondary development inﬂuences current incentives to engage in fundamental
research. There are a number of implications of path dependence. First, as the stock of accumulated
secondary knowledge increases, the secondary knowledge obsolescence that would be induced by
the discovery of fundamental technology m + 1 means that this technology (when discovered) is
less likely to constitute a drastic innovation. Thus, depending on the (random) interval between
fundamental innovations, the economy moves endogenously between periods of drastic and non-
drastic innovation.
Second, once fundamental innovation becomes non-drastic, further secondary development of
an existing fundamental technology m reduces the future limit price that can be charged when
fundamental technology m+1 is discovered. The expected return to fundamental research falls, and
the secondary development of one fundamental technology thus reduces equilibrium employment
in research directed at the discovery of the next fundamental technology. Third, if secondary
38development proceeds suﬃciently far, the economy may become locked-into an existing fundamental
technology. In such an equilibrium, secondary development has increased the productivity of the
existing fundamental technology to such an extent, that it is no longer proﬁtable to search for more
advanced fundamental technologies, despite the fact that these would be more productive if they
had beneﬁted from the same level of secondary development.
Fourth, a model of endogenous innovation in which technological change is path dependent
provides a rationale for cycles in technological leadership. This rationale exists in equilibria with
positive levels of fundamental research and is not limited to the special case of technological lock-
in. Cycles in technological leadership may occur even in a world with no international knowledge
spillovers and no imitation. Once international knowledge spillovers are introduced, the extent of
technological catch-up and leapfrogging depends on the relative magnitude of spillovers of funda-
mental and secondary knowledge.
The model’s tractability made possible a very general speciﬁcation of secondary knowledge
spillovers, and enabled us to consider a number of extensions to the basic model. Uncertainty
over the magnitude of secondary knowledge spillovers leads to a distinction between temporary
technological lock-in (where it is not proﬁtable to employ a new fundamental technology, once
discovered, for small realizations of secondary knowledge spillovers) and permanent technological
lock-in (where it is no longer proﬁtable to search for new fundamental technologies given the
expected magnitude of secondary knowledge spillovers). Introducing multiple intermediate goods
sectors allows technological lock-in to occur in individual sectors of the economy, while the economy
as a whole experiences endogenous growth as a result of both fundamental research and secondary
development.
9A p p e n d i x
9.1 Proof of Proposition 2








If φ0(Sm).Sm/φ(Sm) < 1, the left-hand-side of this inequality is monotonically decreasing in the
stock of accumulated secondary knowledge, S2(t−1)m,( w h e r eS2tm = µ.S2(t−1)m). Therefore, there
exists a critical value for the stock of accumulated secondary knowledge, S0
2(t−1)m ≥ 1, such that
this condition is satisﬁed.
(b) F o rv a l u e so ft h es t o c ko fs e c o n d a r yk n o w l e d g eS2(t−1)m ≥ S0
2(t−1)m, fundamental innovation












.(H − ˆ HF
t ) (48)
Multiply out the term in parentheses on the right-hand side of this equation, and note that
S2tm = µ.S2(t−1)m. Take logarithms of both sides of the equation, and diﬀerentiate with respect to







If φ0(Sm).Sm/φ(Sm) < 1, this term is strictly negative. Therefore, the right-hand side of (48)
is monotonically decreasing in S2(t−1)m. There exists a critical value for the stock of accumulated
secondary S1
















For values of S2(t−1)m ≥ S1
2(t−1)m, equilibrium employment in fundamental research is zero and
the economy becomes locked-into the existing fundamental technology m.
(c) This follows immediately from (b) above.
409.2 Diminishing Returns to Secondary Development
Technological change remains path dependent and technological lock-in remains possible if we
introduce diminishing returns in the process of secondary development. Consider the following

















→ κ, 0 < κ < 1
This speciﬁcation is itself very general and consistent with a wide range of functional forms for
µ(·). We again consider equilibria where the most advanced fundamental technology is selected for
secondary development: j = n = m. The main body of the paper derived a suﬃcient condition for
this to be case.
If fundamental research is unsuccessful in generation t, secondary knowledge relating to the
existing fundamental technology m will accumulate between generations t − 1a n dt according to
equations (8) and (49). The evolution of the stock of secondary knowledge relating to fundamental
technology m is shown diagrammatically in Figure 5. If Sa
m denotes the initial stock of secondary
knowledge when fundamental technology m was discovered, secondary knowledge will, in the ab-
sence of success in fundamental research, continue to accumulate across successive generations until
the steady-state value ˆ Sm is attained. This steady-state value solves µ(ˆ Sm) = 1, and provides an
upper bound to stock of secondary knowledge relating to fundamental technology m that can be
accumulated.
<Figure 5 about here>
Whether the steady-state value ˆ Sm is actually achieved will depend upon the (random) interval
of time between fundamental innovations. Suppose a fundamental innovation occurs in generation
41t before the steady-state value is attained: for example, when the accumulated stock of secondary
knowledge is S2(t−1)m = Sb
m. In this case, the evolution of the stock of secondary knowledge
between generations t − 1a n dt depends upon the extent of secondary knowledge obsolescence:











The dynamics of secondary knowledge accumulation for subsequent generations are directly
analogous. The determination of equilibrium employment in fundamental research is exactly the
same as in the paper, and technological change remains path dependent. Whether technological
lock-in occurs depend upon (a) the random interval between fundamental innovations (as in the
main body of the paper) and (b) whether the critical value for the stock of accumulated secondary
knowledge that induces technological lock-in (S1
2(t−1)m) is less than or greater than the steady-state
value ˆ Sm.
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